take any real notice of the more unusual feature of anonymity. 'By the Court' seems to be all but invisible, except when it is explained away. And yet, today -after a tumultuous half decade that has included the Securities Reference, 11 Nadon, 12 and the Senate Reform Reference, 13 and Carter 14 -it is no longer possible not to notice the part that 'By the Court' played in ratcheting up tension of the Court's public contretemps with the Harper government. 'By the Court' is clearly unusual and unquestionably important, at least sometimes, and yet it remains under--explored to the point of utter neglect. This omission calls for redress, which this article will attempt to provide. Broader Theoretical Attractions There are two important theoretical issues that 'By the Court' judgments highlights in a dramatic way. The first is the presentation factor, the suggestion being that the way the Court presents itself and its decisions (especially but not only the major ones) is a significant element of what the Supreme Court is doing at any specific point in its historical evolution. The content of a major judgment is of course important, but the packaging is important as well; given that the words in a judgment constitute the Court's only way of exercising its influence, it would be strange indeed to suggest that the mode of presentation simply does not matter, that the Court just dashes things off without any thought about how to shape and structure it to best effect. Thinking of this as the product of conscious and shared choices is made more credible by the fact that our Court's self--presentation style has evolved through identifiable stages, and has recently settled on a regular format that is globally unique in a number of ways. 15 McLuhan famously said that the medium is the message; as a more modest variant, the present suggestion is that the packaging matters. Henderson warns us never to treat any aspect of the way a national high court delivers its reasons as something minor, to be shrugged off as an idiosyncratic accident of whim or personality. 16 Rather, the way the Court presents itself must be understood as the consciously shaped product of the institution's reaction to the threats and challenges and opportunities of its immediate historical context, constrained by the expectations of continuity that underpin its legitimacy. Although Henderson was writing about the 11 Reference Re Securities Act 2011 SCC 66, [2011 United States Supreme Court, and specifically about the frequency of minority reasons, this observation has broader applications. The period of the modern high style of "By the Court" judgments is the period of our Supreme Court's emergence as a major national institution, a constitutional court in the fullest sense of the term and a significant player in the major political controversies of the day. Recent decades have seen a considerable degree of constitutional turmoil and change, but arguably the most important consequence been the emergence of the Supreme Court of Canada to a national profile. And many of the decisions that make this observation the most convincing have been delivered 'By the Court'. The second issue is "the many and the one" -less cryptically, the panel court paradox of the unavoidable tension between individualism and institutionalism. On the one hand, the Court is nine fiercely independent professionals, each with a unique sense of priorities and values and a strong desire to see those priorities and values appropriately reflected in Canadian law during their service on the Court; only rarely will these perfectly coincide with the parallel preferences of any of their colleagues, let alone all of them. On the other hand, the Court is (especially today) a major national institution whose preferably unified decisions are expected to deliver finality, certainty, and clarity, especially on the larger issues; this calls for leadership (and therefore followership) and compromise. The first wing of this paradox pulls the Supreme Court toward the fragmented individualism of solo reasons, the second toward a preference at least for solid majorities and at best for unanimity. The Court's location on this continuum is constantly being renegotiated with different answers for different time periods, for different Chief Justices, for different mixtures of personalities, for different sorts of issues and different types of law. The old seriatim style, 17 where every judge wrote free--standing reasons without reference to those of anyone else, represents one extreme end of this continuum; the "By the Court" style, with a single judgment that does not even acknowledge a lead author, is the other extreme. This contrast is rendered all the more fascinating by the fact that there was a clearly identifiable date when our own Supreme Court switched abruptly and decisively (and therefore, presumably, deliberately) from the one to the other for certain important purposes. Defining the Topic: What is "By the Court"? A 'By the Court' judgment is a decision of the Supreme Court that is attributed to the Court itself; no specific judge (or, on more recent practice, no specific pair of judges 18 ) is identified as the lead author(s). This is unusual, because the tradition of common law appeal courts is for individual judges to acknowledge their individual accountability by putting their name to the reasons that they write. 19 We know of course that for the SCC these reasons are actually negotiated products of a collegial "circulate and revise" process, but this qualifies rather than obliterates the specific focused responsibility of the lead author, and we evaluate the performance of specific judges, for praise or blame, in terms of these attributed reasons. 'By the Court' flatly repudiates this expectation: the whole point is that no single judge is identified, no individual accepts responsibility, there is no hint of the "especially me" that such attribution might suggest. The Supreme Court does not adopt this accountability--cloaking device very often, making it obvious that it is a deliberate choice, and that it is therefore it is important to understand when and why they take the unusual step. The first step toward an understanding of 'By the Court' is recognizing the extraordinary nature of this anonymity. In addition to being anonymous, 'By the Court' decisions are also unanimousalthough this should be treated as a matter of "usually" rather than "always and by definition." There are a small number of significant cases where the decision has been presented as a joint judgment of all the judges in the majority despite a divided panel; this is clearly part of the broader phenomenon. 20 These are perhaps "failed" 'By the Court' decisions, but the attempt to achieve the same combination of anonymity and unanimity is clear. Most of the Supreme Court's decisions in recent decades are unanimous but not anonymous; I am drawing attention to the smaller number that are both unanimous and anonymous, but I still want to make room under the umbrella for the even smaller handful that are anonymous without being unanimous. Nadon 21 is the most recent example; the Patriation Reference 22 is the most impressive, with not one but two different sets of anonymous majority reasons for the two questions that the reference needed to address both of which are answered by a jointly--authored dissent, and the Exported Natural Gas Reference 23 is an intriguing echo; 24 Irwin Toy 25 is perhaps the one that stretches the notion the 19 Lasser highlights this practice as anchoring an important difference between the civilian and the common law system, and justifying a more discursive and policy-- 24 The same highly unusual "joint judgment faced by joint dissent" format appears in the Court's recent decision in "Carter 2" -the granting in 2016 of the government's request for an extension of the suspended invalidity of the Criminal Code sections on assisted suicide -with a joint judgment by five justices confronting a joint dissent by four. Since this was a fairly brief decision on a motion, rather than a full decision furthest, co--authored by the three judges in the majority of a five judge panel. Purists might exclude these, but if anonymity is the true core of the phenomenon, then the lack of unanimity (often to the extent of a single solo dissent) is a distinction without a difference. Toward a History of 'By the Court' When was the first 'By the Court'? Readers will expect me to say 1979, but that would be wrong; the right answer is 1893, 26 or perhaps even 1891. 27 How many 'By the Courts' have there been? Readers will expect me to say something in the neighborhood of a couple of dozen, but that would be wrong; the correct answer is just over 500. These answers are strictly accurate, but they are at the same time somewhat unfair, because the hundreds of early 'By the Court's were short decisions by small panels, often dealing with procedural or jurisdictional issues through a consideration of applications and motions, and rarely involving reasons that exceed two or three pages of text. 28 These cases are significant in terms of the institutional history of the Court, 29 but they are thin gruel indeed for expectations that have been shaped by cases like Carter or the Quebec Secession Reference. So I will put aside what we might call the "minor" tradition, for all that it never came to an end and still accounts for the larger number of the "By the Court" judgments even today. I will focus instead on the more recent "grand" tradition, the one that involves major, and almost always constitutional, decisions of some profile and significance. Everything from this point will assume this adjusted focus; when I say "By the Court" it will henceforth mean "in the grand tradition." Even this story, however, does not start when most people assume it does, which is to say with the Laskin Court's 1979 decisions in the politically explosive language on appeal, it is not included in this discussion. See Carter v. Canada (Attorney General) 2016 SCC 4. 25 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General) [1989] 33 case two weeks later. The dozen years of 'By the Court' silence separating them from the pair of language cases is worth noting, although it may mean little more than that constitutional cases were thin on the ground, unanimous decisions in those cases even more so. But clearly the Chief Justice presiding over the initial introduction of the practice was not Laskin but Cartwright. All "first times" call for an explanation -dramatic new practices do not emerge spontaneously out of the blue, especially for judicial institutions whose authority is so deeply embedded in tradition and continuity. What was it that induced the Supreme Court to move the 'By the Court' format from minor and usually procedural cases to the center stage of major constitutional decisions? The critical event seems to have been one of the Supreme Court's most embarrassing moments, namely the Steven Truscott affair. 34 The case was so unique, and the set of reasons it generated so unusual, that it is less the first true 'By the Court' than an important destabilizing moment of transition -an unusual event provoking an extraordinary response, but one that was thereby established as a model available for wider (but not general) subsequent application. That is to say: I suggest a strong form of path dependenceabsent Truscott, there would have been no grand tradition of 'By the Court'. The decisions in Offshore Mineral Reference and Board of Transport Commissioners took that particular form because they could draw on the recent example of Truscott; and a dozen years later Blaikie 35 and Forest 36 could do likewise because the continuing members of the Court remembered the earlier trilogy. At the center of the initial choice was Cartwright; at the center of the sequel were Martland and Ritchie. As all will remember, Truscott was a 14 year--old student who was convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence of the rape and murder of classmate Lynne Harper and sentenced to hang; an appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal was unanimously dismissed, and an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was rejected by a five--judge panel, although the Diefenbaker government commuted the death penalty to life imprisonment. But public unhappiness with the trial and its aftermath persisted, and several years later the pressure on the federal government was still such that they felt they had to do something. The "something" that they settled on involved posing a reference question to the Supreme Court, essentially 30 asking: had you heard the appeal that you denied leave to eight years ago, would you have allowed it? There is no way that this could not have been at least unwelcome and at most highly offensive to the Court, 37 because it was effectively asking them to second--guess their own earlier decision. 38 The discomfort was exacerbated by the fact that four of the five judges from the earlier leave to appeal panel were still on the Court, including the Chief Justice himself. 39 The Truscott case had drawn extraordinary public criticism that showed no signs of dying down, the government was now passing the buck, and the Court's own earlier involvement had already made it part of the controversy, such that it could not distance itself from what might otherwise have been framed as a lower court misstep. In the event, the Court chose to stand firm, and it did so by issuing a truly extraordinary decision. After an appeal process that looked more like a trial than an appeal -stretching over several days with expert testimony and extensive cross--examination 40 -and in an appellate judgment that resembled a trial judgment for its exceptional length and its detailed focus on specific pieces of evidence and extended direct quotations from witnesses, they insisted that the evidence pointed to Truscott as the only possible culprit. On the nine--judge full court panel, only one, Justice Emmett Hall, dissented (at comparable length); the enduring resentments that accompanied him for the rest of his service on the Court show how strong the feelings within the institution were running. 41 The most obvious way for the Court to have spoken with clarity and firmness, especially at a time when fragmented panels were the norm and explicitly identified majority judgments were just emerging, would have been an all--but--one majority judgment made more emphatic by being delivered by the Chief Justice. This 37 Although it was not unprecedented -R. v. Coffin [1956] S.C.R. 191 similarly responded to a federal government reference asking the Court how it would have dealt with an appeal after it had denied the application for leave in that appeal. Reference re Milgaard [1992] 1 S.C.R. 866 is a comparable third example. 38 Technically, not quite: the Criminal Code had been amended in the meantime, and the reference asked what would have happened to the earlier application had those amendments been in place, but given a decade of public controversy over the case, I doubt this was enough to defuse the implicit challenge. 39 I was not able to find the composition of the 1959 leave to appeal panel in any of the books or articles on the Truscott affair; the Registrar of the Supreme Court was kind enough to send me a copy of the record of the panel's decision. 40 To quote from the headnotes in the Supreme Court Reports: "At this hearing, the Court received a large body of evidence, much of it relating to the medical aspects of the case and also heard the oral evidence of the accused who had not given evidence at the trial. possibility was presumably undercut by the Chief Justice's involvement in the earlier leave--to--appeal panel, which would have enhanced the "I still agree with myself" overtones that many thought had rendered the use of the reference process problematic from the beginning. The Court opted instead for a united--front "joint opinion" 42 by eight judges listed by name. It had never done such a thing before, but any "first ever" practice is necessarily available for subsequent emulation in different circumstances, and this is what happened six months later, in the two constitutional decisions in November. Since these two later decisions were unanimous they took the form of "joint opinion(s) of the Court". 43 The Laskin Court's language decisions of 1979 therefore represent not innovation but revival -and given that two members of the panels for those 1979 cases (namely Martland and Ritchie) had served on all three of the 1967 panels, it seems plausible to present their own experiences and memories as the basis for a conscious and deliberate revival. Laskin has a well--deserved reputation as the great watershed Chief Justice, presiding over the transition from the "old" Supreme Court that gutted the Diefenbaker Bill of Rights to the "new" Supreme Court celebrated today, but the credit for the innovation of the "By the Court" judgment belongs not to Laskin but to one of his predecessors, namely Cartwright. 44 Creating the Inventory of 'By the Court' I have defined the phenomenon, described its early history and its emergence, and narrowed the focus to the "grand tradition" of major cases, which I will somewhat generously define as reserved judgments with reasons running over 4000 words. 45 There have been 50 of these in the 48 years since 1967, a number that shrinks to 45 if we treat companion cases (of which there have been three pairs and one triplet) as single examples. I have already spoken about the two early examples from the 42 It seems worth noting that the Supreme Court has only used the "joint opinion" self--description for a decision on three occasions, those three being Truscott, the Offshore Mineral Reference, and Board of Transport Commissioners. 43 Truscott and Offshore Minerals both being federal reference questions, "joint opinion" is the precisely correct term; but Board of Transport Commissioners was a straightforward appeal from a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, and therefore presumably should have been labeled a "joint judgment." More recent usage has been more rigorous and consistent on the judgment/opinion distinction. 44 Technically to Taschereau, who was still Chief Justice for Truscott (but not for Offshore Minerals and Board of Transport Commissioners), but as Vaughan's biography of Hall explains as delicately as possible, Taschereau was failing by the time of the Truscott hearings, and Cartwright -his successor presumptive -was clearly in charge. 45 But I will stretch the point to include the much shorter decision in Forest, on the grounds that Blaikie/Forest are companion cases that should in some sense be treated as a package.
Cartwright Court in 1967; I will now provide an overview of the "grand tradition" By the Court judgments for each of the subsequent Chief Justiceships.
a. By the Court: The Laskin Court The Laskin Court handed down nine major 'By the Court' judgments over a period of five years (stretching over six different calendar years). The focus is striking: six of the nine cases are reference cases posed by governments (federal or provincial), and the other three are direct constitutional challenges to the actions of provincial governments. The loose generalization that one can often find in the literature is that 'By the Court' judgments are all about constitutional law, and this decision string for the Laskin Court completely vindicates this notion. For the Laskin Court, we can make the generalization even more specific: By the Court judgments are all about federalism, and mostly about reference cases. 46 But if we say "the Laskin Court," are we necessarily saying Laskin? To put it in other words: what is really happening behind the veil of 'By the Court'? One possibility is that the judgment really is a collective process to an extent far beyond the circulate--and--revise process that the Court usually follows. 47 In another article, I have used 46 I note that Blaikie 1 and Forest are not "pure" companion cases because they were not argued before the Court on the same day, nor were they considered by the same panel of judges, although judgment was delivered on the same day and they are directly sequential in the Supreme Court Reports; I think under the circumstances it is more useful than misleading to consider them as companion cases. 47 My research has turned up only a single "By the Board" decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in this new century, and that was explained in the opening sentence in terms of every member of the panel having participated to such an extent that it would have been misleading to attribute it to a single individual; the case was Cukurova Finance International Ltd. v Alfa Telecom Turkey Ltd, [2013] function word analysis 48 to explore the question of who was the initial drafter of the 'By the Court' judgments, which undermines the the "strong committee" theory of 'By the Court' by demonstrating that the methodology points usually to a single judge and only sometimes to a possible pair of judges 49 as the most likely writers; only for a single case is there such a multi--way tie as to suggest a team process. The second possibility is that 'By the Court' is a nom de plume for a judgment that is actually written by the Chief Justice, a sort of judicial equivalent of the "royal we" (or "majestic plural"). In general terms, this is not borne out by the function word analysis described above; Chief Justices do the initial drafting for some but by no means all or even most of the 'By the Court' decisions. The "first among equals" leadership of the modern Chief Justice is a phenomenon that is not completely understood, but it would be a serious overstatement to reduce 'By the Court' to such a narrow framing. This therefore leaves us with the third possibility: behind the façade of 'By the Court', it is largely business as usual with the Supreme Court, which is to say that the assignment of the responsibility of drafting the initial reasons is handled on the basis of a rotation between a number of judges, tilted strongly toward the more senior members of the Court. 50 But this, of course, just knocks out two "easy" answers as to what 'By the Court' is all about, and leaves the "why these?" question as mysterious as ever. UKPC 2. We have had no comparable explanation, within the reasons for judgment or otherwise, of the SCC's use of the format. 48 Function word analysis calculates each judge's relative usage patterns for fifty--some of the most common words, and then identifies the most likely author by generating similarity scores with the corresponding usage patterns in the analysis sections of each of the 'By the Court' judgments. See Peter McCormick, "Nom de Plume: Who Writes the Supreme Court's 'By the Court' Judgments?" Dalhousie Law Journal, forthcoming. The language problem -some judges initially write in English, some in French, and some are "switch--hitters" -is less of a problem than might be anticipated because the Supreme Court Reports tell us that almost all of the 'By the Court' judgments were initially written in English. 49 Even assuming that the "tie" in function--word similarity scores indicates a two--judge collaboration of this sort (which is itself a bit of a stretch), this would not of itself explain the 'By the Court' format because two--judge co--authorships are a fairly common practice on the modern Supreme Vol. 38 (2015) . In the immediate context of the Laskin Court and the specific role of Laskin: there is some reason to doubt that Laskin himself played a strong part in the re--emergence of 'By the Court' in and after 1979. When the device was redeployed in the fall of 1979, Laskin was absent for almost the entire term, hospitalized in Vancouver and returning (to Ottawa but not to full service on the Court) just before the decisions were handed down. He is therefore more likely to have been passenger than leader on those important re--introductory examples. It is also striking that the use of 'By the Court' dates not from the early stages of Laskin's Chief Justiceship but rather from the mid--point, and in particular from the half--term when he was away from the Court. This does not make it impossible for Laskin to have played some role in the innovation, but it makes it less likely. b. By the Court: The Dickson Court For the Dickson Court, By the Court judgments are more numerous but their use is considerably more diffuse. Only two involved federalism issues, and one of these was the extended follow--up to Forest in the same way that Blaikie 2 expanded and fulfilled Blaikie 1; and three others grew out of the Supreme Court's new challenge of an entrenched Charter of Rights. There is a pair of cases involving First Nations issues, but these are not decisions that loom large in the Court's development of First Nations jurisprudence. And there is a curious pair of relatively short decisions -Dorval and Wigman -striking for the fact that neither raises any constitutional issue at all. Their inclusion in the "grand tradition" is therefore mildly suspect. These two cases aside, the generalization that "By the Court" is about constitutional law is sustained, although the scope of constitutional concerns addressed is considerably broader. Only one of the cases (Manitoba Language) is a reference question, federal or provincial; all the others apparently involved a discretionary proactive choice by the panel to treat this particular case anonymously, although the reasons for this choice are never made explicit. [1989] 1 SCR 927 22,707 Charter Daigle v Tremblay [1989] 2 SCR 530 13,593 Charter Note: * = companion cases Eleven examples in six years certainly suggests a vigorous and deliberate 'By the Court' strategy on the part of Chief Justice Dickson, but the impression needs to be adjusted in light of the fact that some of the examples are clearly less a matter of strategic choice than of administrative convenience, a way of dealing with "problem" cases where a judgment simply could not be attributed in the "normal" way. As the Sharp and Roach biography shows, the Dickson Court had significant and recurring problems with the chronic poor health of several of the judges, aggravating the double challenge of a high case load and the pressure of dealing with the precedentially critical "first generation" of Charter decisions. This resulted in several 'By the Court' decisions that we might think as "accidental", and the purest example is Healy. 51 After a standard 'By the Court' beginning ("judgment delivered by THE COURT"), the actual text begins "We adopt the reasons for judgment written and circulated by our late and much respected Justice Chouinard during the Fall Term. The reasons follow." That is to say: the 'By the Court' format notwithstanding, there is an attributed solo author, but under such circumstances that it could not be handled in the usual fashion. The major language decisions of Ford and Devine are examples of somewhat similar circumstances. 52 At his request, Le Dain had been assigned the drafting of the reasons for judgment and had circulated a version during the summer of 1988, only to be incapacitated and hospitalized in the fall -so much so that the work of revising the initial draft fell to Lamer and Wilson. Le Dain's condition was serious enough that he could not sign his name to the final version, either as attributed author or even as participating and judgment--supporting panel member, and this is why the Supreme Court Reports indicate (in a way that is technically correct but still profoundly misleading) that he "did not participate in the judgment." The absence of a Healy--style first sentence is presumably explained by the difficulty in finding an explanation that would adequately cover the ground without embarrassing anyone. Canadian Pacific v. Paul (handed down the same day as Ford and Devine) may be another example, with a seven--judge panel reduced by three retirements, pushing the Court very close to needing a rehearing of the case. 53 On function word analysis, the most likely author is Estey -but he had to be listed as "did not participate" because more than six months had elapsed since his retirement. 51 A.G. Quebec v. Healy [1987] 1 S.C.R. 158 52 See Sharpe & Roach, Dickson: A Judge's Journey, pp427--432. There is no suggestion that these decisions would have taken the 'By the Court' appearance had Le Dain been able to follow through with the revisions himself. 53 Under Supreme Court rules, five judges is the minimum for hearing an appeal, but four judges still able to "participate" in the judgment is the minimum for delivering a decision, and this only when the parties have consented to it. Judges can still participate in delivering a judgment for a case where they heard the oral arguments, but only for a period of six months after retirement.
The reduced count of seven 'By the Court' decisions in six years is still worthy of note, but it is curious -and further undermines any impression of a considered consolidation of the practice -that a further pair of them (Dorval in 1985 and Wigman in 1987) raise no constitutional issues whatever.
c. By the Court: the Lamer Court The Lamer Court delivered half a dozen substantial 'By the Court' judgments; one was yet another installment of the Manitoba language litigation (Forest being "Manitoba 1", "Manitoba 2" showing up for Dickson, and now "Manitoba 3" for Lamer), and a second was a relatively short and minor case on a municipal vote in Quebec (Sinclair). The other four, however, bracket the major constitutional issues of recent decades: two significant Charter cases (Tobias on judicial independence, Libman on limiting election expenses), arguably the most important case to date on federalism (Secession Reference), and one of the most important (certainly the most explosive and controversial) of recent cases dealing with First Nations Issues (Marshall 2). On the one hand, the number of these cases has declined to the point where there is a five--year period without a single example, the longest such gap since 1979; on the other hand, the focus of the subject matter is wider and the importance of (some of) the cases is unquestionable. The 'By the Court' list for the McLachlin Court is by far the longest and most impressive of all the Chief Justiceships. This is not just a reflection of the fact that (as of September 2014) McLachlin became the longest--serving Chief Justice in the history of the institution; the "per year" count is slightly below that for the Dickson Court (and well above it if we exclude the "accidental" 'By the Court's). More to the point, however, a high proportion of the cases on the McLachlin list are robust cases of considerable weight, well above the 9,000 words that is the average length of the reasons for judgment in a reserved decision. This suggests that the use of 'By the Court' is becoming not just more frequent but also more targeted and deliberate. The second is in some ways the most curious -the decision in BCE, which has been welcomed 56 (and also criticized 57 ) as an important landmark decision in company law, dealing with the obligations of corporate boards. This is only the third 'By the Court' judgment in what I have been calling the grand tradition not to raise any constitutional issues whatever, the other two being the Dickson Court's short and clearly less portentous decisions in Dorval and Wigman. With the obvious caution that it takes more than one swallow to signal a summer, this may be a first step toward the conscious use of 'By the Court' judgments for decisions that are intended as major and hopefully landmark contributions to unsettled corners of the law, and doing so with a somewhat wider sweep than the constitutional law issues that have provided the focus of the practice to date. However, this is not to deny for a second that the center of gravity of the device remains in the area of constitutional law, and the McLachlin Court has clearly boxed the compass in this regard with decisions dealing with federalism issues, Charter questions, and First Nations matters. From List to Story When I started on this project, I was confident that I knew the general outlines of the history of 'By the Court'. That story would have started with Laskin, who (I then thought) was directly involved in the emergence of the innovation, but whose use of 'By the Court' was as tentative and occasional as the term "emergent innovation" implies, the more so because it began only rather late in the Chief Justiceship when his health was already failing. The story would have continued with a more frequent and enthusiastic use of the device under Dickson's leadership, with almost a dozen solid examples that included some of the must urgent and controversial issues of the day as the language question continued to heat up and the Charter jurisprudence began to take shape. I would have described this as the "coming of age" of the practice, constrained first by the short period during which Dickson served as Chief Justice and second by a paucity of the federal reference cases that had already seemed to be earning pride of place for the practice. Lamer, however, delivered a mixed message. On the one hand, with half as many 'By the Court' decisions as Dickson in a Chief Justiceship that was twice as long, seemed to point to a gradual decline, a possible ending of the "glory days." It is particularly striking that Quebec Sales Tax Reference in 1994 is the only unanimous decision on a federal reference question in the last fifty years that was NOT "By the Court". On the other hand, the Quebec Secession Reference is arguably the quintessential 'By the Court' judgment, the poster--child that would lead off any focused discussion of the practice. Finally, McLachlin seemed to represent a significant revival, with a constitutional "By the Court" decision in the first six months and a subsequent per--year delivery approaching that of the Dickson Court. I would now back away from much of that description and will instead use the preceding chronology to deliver rather a different message. And I will do so by drawing identifying three substantively different sets of 'By the Court' decisions, 58 describing how their interplay over time generates rather a different conclusion. a. First, the reactive conversation set The most obvious subset of the 'By the Court' lists above is the cases involving answers to reference questions from government. I describe it as "reactive" for the obvious reason that the government has to have made the decision to ask the question in the first place; I call it a "conversation" because, as I will argue at more length below, the 'By the Court' device turns this into a conversation between government as an institution and the Supreme Court as a unified institution. The reference process is an unusual aspect of Canadian practice that permits the government to put hypothetical or anticipatory questions before the Court. This makes them quite different from normal appeals, which involve cases that arise out of specific concrete circumstances, that come with a context that has been judicially explored by the lower courts, that have an established set of relevant facts that have been tested through an adversary process, and that are essentially retrospective, arriving at general and abstract questions only as they emerge from those concrete fact and law circumstances. By contrast, reference questions make the Court function in a way that makes it more like a legislature: 59 it is asked to work in a judicial--factual vacuum, answering hypothetical questions in general terms, and implicitly committing itself in advance to rules or principles that have not been tested in concrete circumstances or sounded out in lower court proceedings. 60 58 Technically four, of course, if we include the "accidental" set described above for the Dickson Court, where 'By the Court' seems to have served as an administrative necessity for decisions initially assigned in the normal way that could not be reported in the normal way. In Healy, Chouinard had died in the interval; in Ford and Devine, LeDain had suffered a breakdown; in Clark, three retirements had reduced the panel to its constitutional minimum. There is no clear reason to think that this list could be expanded by any further examples 59 This is why, when Australia amended its constitution in X to allow the federal government to pose reference questions to its own High Court, that Court promptly decided that the amendment itself was unconstitutional because it violated the principle of the separation of powers. See Helen Irving, "Advisory Opinions, the Rule of Law and the Separation of Powers" Macquarie Law Journal, Vol. 4 (2004) . 60 The Court always formally insists that its decisions in federal reference cases (which it self--describes as "opinions" rather than "judgments") are purely advisory and tentative and cannot serve as precedent in the same way as normal judgments; supported position. The abolition of appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 1949 had no effect on this judgment delivery style. But Truscott is the great watershed -every single reference case before, but not a single such case afterward, was dealt with seriatim. There have been 20 reference cases in and after 1967; thirteen were unanimous, and fourteen were resolved by joint judgments, anonymous in the sense that they lacked the normal author--identifying attribution. The overlap of those two categories goes someway to explaining why 'By the Court' has generally been taken as implying both unanimity and anonymity: only one post--1967 reference case was unanimous without being anonymous, and only two were anonymous without being unanimous. The significance of 'By the Court' in this situation is that it effectively positions the Supreme Court as a unified institution providing the other half of a conversation about national governance with the federal government. It is not that the government was not bound by the actual outcome of previous reference cases; and it is certainly not to deny that some had significant impact. The point is rather that there was no clear unified statement from the Court as an institution, no single firm collective declaration of the law and the reasons for it. It is the clarity of this product in the directly policy--relevant moment of a federal reference that makes 'By the Court' a significant element in the emergence of the Court as a major national institution. But one major implication of this powerful opportunity for influence is that it is necessarily reactive: one can only answer a question when and if one has been asked the question in the first place. 61 To this point I have been discussing federal reference questions, but in Canadian usage the provinces have also given themselves the parallel power vis--à--vis their own provincial highest courts, with an option of appealing that decision to the Supreme Court itself. It is also worth noting, however, that these cases are not normally resolved through 'By the Court' decisions. Despite an early appearance to the contrary when the Laskin Court used 'By the Court' for provincial references as regularly and as often as federal references -the set includes the Patriation
McEvoy 65 -only a single more recent provincial reference (Firearms Reference 66 ) has been dealt with this way. This is despite the fact that the Supreme Court has dealt with as many provincial as federal references in the last fifty years, that most of them have been unanimous, and that a number of them have dealt with major constitutional issues. As a first important finding, then: 'By the Court' has been developed as the Court's preferred way of dealing with federal (but not provincial) reference cases, provided unanimity can be achieved but on occasion even when it cannot. Second, the judicial institutional set The second set of 'By the Court' judgments involves cases that deal with issues that relate directly to the judiciary as an institution, sometimes focusing on the Supreme Court itself and sometimes involving more general matters. The suggested list is: 18,513 Amendments re SCC Two reference cases (Truscott and Nadon, the artistically neat book ends of the set) are included again here as well as in the previous section; in a way, they seem to volunteer for such "double counting" because they are two of only a handful cases which use an impersonal attribution style despite a divided panel. Truscott has been discussed above as an unusual challenge to the prestige of the Supreme Court. Nadon was comparably embarrassing, dealing with a unique challenge to the validity of an appointment to the Supreme Court as well as obliquely raising unsettled questions about the constitutional amending formulae as they relate to the Supreme Court itself. Wewaykum and Mugesara both involved recusal issues on the Supreme Court, these being critically important to the judiciary because they go to the question of impartiality. Marshall 2 was a unique institutional response (an extended denial of an application to reconsider "Marshall 1" 67 ) to an unexpected and unwelcome public reaction to the earlier decision which had been understood (in a way which Marshall 2 said was unjustified) very expansively. Tobiass and Provincial Judges Association are two cases in an extensive string of important (and usually not unanimous) cases revolving around judicial independence issues. 68 And although the "up front" issue in Ahmad was the recurrent dilemma of the balance between individual rights and national security, the major substance of the decision dealt with the jurisdiction of the provincial superior ("Section 96") courts, and whether a legislative assignment of certain aspects of the case to the Federal Court did or did not violate that jurisdiction. This is not to say that all cases involving judicial institutional questions, or even all such unanimous cases, are dealt with through the anonymity of 'By the Court'. Clearly the most important recent case dealing with the judiciary was the 1997 Remuneration Reference, 69 which could have been a joint judgment even over top of LaForest's vigorous dissent, like Truscott and Nadon, but it was not. Although not as clear--cut as the first, this set seems firmly enough established to justify identifying judicial institutional matters as a second focus for 'By the Court' decisions. Third: The proactive set The third use of 'By the Court' is the proactive set: the Court decides on its own initiative and for its own reasons that an issue arising in a "normal" appeal (that is to say, not a reference case) deserves this unusual decision format. The label is "proactive" because the decision to elevate the matter to this decision format is made by the Court itself, without any clear external trigger (a federal reference, a judicial institutional issue) to indicate clearly and ahead of time that a case was likely to be decided 'By the Court.' In one sense, this is simply a residual category, the cases that are left when those that can be assigned to other categories have been removed. But in another sense, this is the most intriguing and potentially exciting use of 'By the Court', involving the most discretionary and inherently open--ended deployment of this new judgment--presentation device, and a standing opportunity to create or to continue or reinforce or expand a precedent in a particularly emphatic way. 70 67 R. v. Marshall [1999] 
